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different set of contradictory properties to him. On this account, at one and the
same time Christ as omniscient knows that he is unable to sin and as human,
having the epistemic possibility of sinning, does not know that he is unable to
sin. It seems to me arguable that the reduplicative strategy applied to the traditional
account of the two natures of Christ could show that in attributing both omniscience and limited knowledge to Christ we are not attributing contradictory
properties to one and the same thing. But if so, then the reduplicative strategy
is also sufficient to show that in attributing to Christ both necessary goodness
and the ability to sin we aren't predicating contradictory attributes of him either.
My review has concentrated on the parts of Morris's book which are bound
to be controversial, but that approach must not be allowed to obscure the substantial achievement of this book. With admirable boldness, Morris has set out to
defend one of the Christian doctrines which has always seemed most vulnerable
to philosophical attack. He is obviously at home in dealing with both philosophical
and theological literature on the subject, and his treatment of the doctrine's
detractors is patient and fair. The presentation of his own account is beautifully
clear and philosophically sophisticated, and he develops his position with
ingenuity and subtlety. While I find problems in Morris's view of Christ as
having two minds, the general strategy underlying this view, of compartmentalizing the divine and human attributes of Christ and predicating them of Christ
secundum quid rather than simpliciter, seems to me certainly on the right track.
Although there is much to disagree with in the book, then, it is nonetheless a
model for the way philosophy of religion should be done. Not everyone will
agree with Morris's interpretation and defense of the incarnation, but no one
should ignore them.

The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human
Freedom, by William Lane Craig. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987, 157 pp., $7.95
(paper), ISBN 0-8010-2519-2.
Reviewed by WILLIAM HASKER, Huntington College.
According to William Lane Craig, "today the Christian seeking after truth will
probably learn more about the attributes of God from works of Christian philosophers than from those of Christian theologians" (p. 11). In this volume he
presents the results of philosophical work on the doctrine of omniscience, focusing
on the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will with some attention
given also to middle knowledge.
Craig states his belief that "any reader who is willing to take the time and
make an effort to evaluate the reasoning presented here will find it simple enough
to grasp" (p. 12). He has, in fact, succeeded to a remarkable degree in giving
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lucid, non-technical explanations with minimal sacrifice of philosophical accuracy; the book should be useful for students at an introductory level. At the same
time, he has included some topics seldom discussed in connection with the
foreknowledge issue, so that the book can be a source of new ideas and insights
even for philosophers well versed in the topic. Of interest here is a series of
chapters on "Rejection of Fatalism in Other Fields," which parallels his rejection
of theological fatalism; the "other fields" are backward causation, time travel,
precognition, and Newcomb's Paradox. The discussion of these topics does not
add anything in a strict logical sense to the discussion of theological fatalism
(nor does the author claim otherwise), but the topics are fascinating in their own
right and the parallels drawn are illuminating. Also of interest is Craig's discussion, at various points throughout the book, of the contrast between the A-theory
and the B-theory of time; he correctly notes that the choice one makes here
places constraints on the possible solutions of the foreknowledge problem. Yet
another merit of the book is Craig's placement of the issue solidly within a
theological context, with attention to the role of divine omniscience in the life
of faith. The down side of this is that he may be a bit too ready to take up the
theological cudgels and belabor his opponents for unorthodoxy.
But the book has faults as well as merits. One small but important omission
is his failure to provide either a formal definition or an explicit discussion of
the nature of free will; clearly the notion he has in mind is broadly libertarian,
but the details are never spelled out. The notes are adequate, considering the
nature of the work, but a large proportion of the works cited are from the 1960s
and 1970s, with few from the 1980s, tending to create the (perhaps incorrect)
impression that much of the research for the book was done several years ago.
The more recent citations seem to follow a pattern in which Craig cites one or
two sources that confirm his position, while ignoring those which take an opposing
view. For example, on the "necessity of the past" ("hard and soft facts"), he
cites what he rightly terms Freddoso's "brilliant study" (p. 81),1 but he ignores
discussions by Fischer and others which have argued that such an analysis does
not succeed in turning back theological fatalism. 2 Naturally not every relevant
study can be cited in a brief popular work such as this, but the pattern followed
by Craig creates a distinctly misleading impression of the current state of the
philosophical discussion.
This point connects with what may be an even more serious weakness:
throughout the book Craig consistently expresses more confidence (not to say
dogmatism) about the evident correctness of his positions than is warranted by
his evidence and arguments. In his first two chapters setting out the biblical
doctrine of omniscience, Craig reaches standard Arminian conclusions: God
foreknows all but does not predestine everything which happens, and human
free will is not compromised. But the reader is led to suppose that this is the
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only viable way of reading the relevant biblical passages. The view that we have
here an ultimate paradox, irresolvable by human reason, is not even mentioned,
though I should think this view would be quite difficult to refute on biblical
grounds. And the Calvinistic view of absolute sovereignty and predestination is
introduced only as one of two "Denials of the Biblical Doctrine"! Later chapters
are peppered with remarks such as "the argument for theological fatalism is
simply fallacious" (p. 74), "It seems that the fatalists' final gambit has failed"
(p. 82), and the like. The current state of the discussion of this topic simply
does not warrant such smug assurance, and the reader who receives the impression
that it does is being misled. Accuracy and due humility alike require that one's
own view on this issue (whatever that view may be) should be presented as one
possible (and favored) resolution of the problem, one which however has impressive rivals and is also confronted with difficulties at various points.
In view of space limitations, only one substantive issue can be addressed:
How is it that God is able to know future free actions? Craig states (rightly, in
my opinion), that "The Christian cannot be expected to explain the actual way
that God foreknows future free events; all the Christian has to do is suggest
some possible way" (p. 119). I shall discuss the first of the two "possible ways"
he considers, namely innate knowledge. (The other way, middle knowledge,
raises questions too complex for discussion here.)
Of interest is Craig's reason for rejecting another way that some have thought
possible. Some writers hold that God's beliefs about a future event can be
retrospectively brought about or caused by the event itself.3 But Craig accepts
the A-theory of time, according to which temporal becoming is real and events
of the future do not yet exist-thus, it seems impossible for God's present beliefs
to be brought about by non-existent future events (see pp. 119-20). The truth
may be, rather, that this knowledge of God's is innate: "God never learned or
acquired his knowledge, but has eternally known an innate store of only and all
true statements. Since future-tense statements are either true or false, God in
knowing all true statements knows the future" (p. 123). And if we still insist on
asking "How is it the case that God has innate knowledge?" that question "appears
to be merely an expression of incredulity which requires no answer. God simply
is that way, just as he is also omnipotent, necessary, morally perfect, and so
forth .... That is part of what it means to be God, to be omniscient. And to
ask how it is that God is omniscient is like asking how it is that vacuums are
empty" (p. 123).
But is innate knowledge a "possible way" for God to foreknow free actions?
We have on the one hand God's beliefs about temporal events, beliefs he has
held from all eternity. And on the other hand, we have the unfolding sequence
of temporal events themselves. Furthermore, there is (by hypothesis) an exact
correspondence between the events and the beliefs. Now the question is, What

Faith and Philosophy

226

explains this exact correspondence? How do we account for it? (I do not want
to be told that "God is just that way." The question is not why God holds true
beliefs in general, it is why he holds these particular beliefs. And since the
beliefs in question are contingent, it is also contingent that God holds them; it
is not "natural" for him to hold these beliefs, so some further explanation is
indeed called for.) The following alternatives seem to exhaust the possibilities:
(1) There is no explanation; it just happens for no reason that the beliefs
and the events always correspond.
(2) The beliefs are determined to be as they are by the events.
(3) The events are determined to be as they are by the beliefs.
(4) Both the events and the beliefs are determined to be as they are by
some other factor.
Of the four (1) seems to be out of the question; it is not just by good luck
that God always gets things right. (2) is ruled out for Craig, as we have noted,
because non-existent future events cannot cause things in the present. And he
doesn't think our actions are caused by God's beliefs, so we are left with (4).
What could the "other factor" be? Since the events thus determined include all
contingent facts about the world, it would seem that this factor must be internal
to God. Since the facts are contingent, the "factor" can't be essential to God;
most likely, then, it is his decree, or his will, or something of the sort. In any
case, it is evident that both (3) and (4) are inconsistent with the notion that any
of the events known are free. So we return to the question: Is innate knowledge
a possible way for God to foreknow free actions? There may be a good answer
to this, but if there is Craig doesn't tell us what it is.
In spite of the reservations noted, The Only Wise God is a worthwhile contribution both to the literature and to available teaching materials on this topic. The
production and printing of the book by Baker are excellent, especially in view
of the modest cost. Each chapter has a list of suggested further reading, and
there is a brief but useful index.
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